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POLICE SCIENCE
THE CHANGING FACE OF CRIMINAL LAW
DONALD S. LEONARD
Donald S. Leonard has been prominent in public service in the State of Michigan, having served
for 30 years with the Michigan State Police retiring in 1952 as Commissioner to accept appointment
as Commissioner of the Detroit Police Department, from which he resigned in 1954. Presently he is
serving as Chairman of the Michigan Liquor Control Commission. During World War 11 he was
Special Assistant to the United States Director of Civil Defense and Director of the Michigan Civil
Defense. He is a member of the Michigan and American Bar Associations. His present article was
presented at the 71st Annual Conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in Octo-
ber, 1964, at Louisville, Kentucky.-EnrroR.
The basic principles of law enforcement to which
our police agencies are dedicated have been grad-
ually eroded to the point where the right of the
public to protection has been dearly endangered.
Court decisions on arrests, search and seizure,
admissibility of evidence, interrogation, and the
admissibility of voluntary confessions have re-
sulted in case dismissals, acquittals, and exclusion
of evidence, which have in turn perceptibly weak-
ened the foundations of American law enforcement.
Here is an excerpt from the publication of the
Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police which
summarizes the extent of the problem:'
"When courts set to naught the efforts of police,
a dangerous situation arises and an alarmed
citizenry may well exclaim, 'Why throw techni-
calities around the thug, insuring his protection at
the expense and sacrifice of the honest and well-
meaning citizen?"'
That article was written in August, 1933. It shows
that we are not facing a new problem, but one
which has plagued us for many years. But the
problem has grown to one of major proportions
in recent years. It has reached the point where we
must initiate action aimed at remedying the
situation.
As recently as October 8, 1964, a U.S. district
judge directed a verdict of not guilty for a con-
fessed killer, although, in the judge's words, the
task made him almost "physically ill."' The
I TUEBOR, MICHIGAN ASSOcIATION or C=HEFS or
PoucE, Vol. 3, No. 7, August, 1933.
2 U. S. NEws AND WoRLD REPoRT, Oct. 12, 1964,
quoting at page 18: Washington-James W. Killough,
who confessed three times that he murdered his wife,
was set free by a U. S. district court on October 8.
The reason: The Supreme Court's Mallory rule,
judge's action was forced by a decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals ruling invalid three con-
fessions the man had made, primarily on the
ground that the original confession was made
during a period of unreasonable delay prior to
arraignment. Although the confessed killer had
been convicted twice for manslaughter for the
crime, the Appeals Court decision overturned
these convictions.3
Of course, we hold that the protection of in-
which invalidates confessions as evidence if there has
been "unnecessary" delay between the time of a man's
arrest and his appearance before a magistrate.
"In this case," District Court judge George I. Hart,
Jr., told a hushed courtroom, "defendant on three sepa-
rate occasions voluntarily confessed of foully killing his
wife and throwing her body on a dump like a piece of
garbage. He led police there. Yet, the United States
Court of Appeals in its wisdom has seen fit to throw the
confessions out.
"We know the man is gulty,... but we sit here,
blind, deaf, and dumb.... Felons will sleep better
tonight."
Judge Hart told how, for the same charge, Killough
had twice been convicted of manslaughter in earlier
trials. The first conviction was set aside because Kil-
lough was not taken before a magistrate for approxi-
mately 26 hours after arrest. This was held to violate
the Mallory rule, first stated by the U. S. Supreme
Court in 1957.
A second confession was thrown out because it was
held to stem from, and be "tainted" by, the first.
Killough's next conviction was set aside on the
ground that a third confession was made in an inter-
view with a jail clerk, and there was "an implied pledge
of confidentiality" in such an interview according to
the appeals court.
Without this confession, there was not enough evi-
dence to convict Killough, Judge Hart told a jury as-
sembled for a third trial.
"I will direct a verdict of acquittal," judge Hart
said, "and I do so with a heavy heart.... In fact, it
almost makes me physically ill."
3Killough v. U. S., 336 Fed. 2nd 929.
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dividual rights is vital to the protection of the
rights of the public-for the individual IS the
public. It behooves us to remember at all times
that the fundamental concept of American justice
is that a person is presumed innocent until proven
otherwise. The problem is to attain the proper
balance between individual rights and the public
welfare. We do not believe that such a proper
balance has been achieved. We believe that court
decisions have gone too far, that the courts are,
in many cases, ignoring the public right to pro-
tection.
A very real danger-perhaps the most dangerous
aspect of this trend-is the possibility that the
ever-changing face of criminal law, with new
Supreme Court decisions invalidating old ones
plus contradictory decisions from other courts,
will breed indecision and uncertainty in the in-
dividual police officer. The inevitable result would
be a negative effect at the very grass roots of law
enforcement. The police officer is not presumed to
exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer.
Often he must act in haste on his own belief to
prevent the escape of the criminal. The courts
must not terrorize peace officers by putting them
in fear of violating the law themselves.
4
Fred Inbau, professor of law at Northwestern
University, put it this way:
"The courts ought to set their handcuffs aside.
The concern of the judiciary should be this and
nothing else: Permitting the conviction of the
guilty while affording full protection to the inno-
cent."5
These contradictory court decisions and the lack
of statutory guidelines in many areas of law
enforcement have put police agencies in a dilemma.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have made the
work of the police officer increasingly complex,
and there is no reason to believe that today's
interpretations by the court will not be outdated
by it tomorrow.
For example, what has come to be known as the
"McNabb-Mallory Rationale" has, over the years,
exercised an inordinate influence on law enforce-
4 In People v. Ziegler, 358 Mich. 355, Michigan Su-
preme Court Justice Talbot Smith warned: "We should
not demand of a police officer that he weigh the circum-
stances confronting him with the detachment and pre-
cision of a laboratory technician while the seconds may
be ticking away his span of life."5 
NoRTHwasTERN UNiv. LAW REv., Vol. 52, No. 1,
pp. 1-90, editorial foreward to six articles in a sym-
posium upon the subject, Are the Courts Handcuffing
the Police?
ment procedures.6 In the first case, McNabb v.
the United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), the Su-
preme Court indicated its aversion to arraign-
ments not held with "reasonable promptness."
The case in question involved several murder
suspects taken into custody and held for 24 hours
prior to arraignment before a U.S. Commissioner.
During this time one of the suspects confessed the
killing. Although there was no charge of so-called
third degree tactics against the interrogating
officers, the court held that police detention of
defendants beyond the time when a committing
magistrate was readily accessible constituted
"willful disobedience of law," and that in order
to adequately enforce congressional requirement
of prompt arraignment, it was deemed necessary
to render inadmissible incriminating statements
elicited from defendants during a period of un-
lawful detention.
The principles established in the McNabb case
were applied with greater emphasis in the Mallory
case. In Mallory, the Court held that a confession,
even though voluntarily given, could not be used
in evidence if it was obtained between the time of
arrest and the time of arraignment, stating, "We
cannot sanction this extended delay, resulting in
confession, without subordinating the general rule
of prompt arraignment to the discretion of arrest-
ing officers in finding exceptional circumstances for
its disregard." In other words, a delay by police
in promptly arraigning the accused would ap-
parently result in the entire proceedings against
the defendant being set aside because of this delay,
if such delay was of a nature to give opportunity
for the extraction of a confession.
The far-reaching effects of the McNabb-Mallory
Rationale have raised numerous objections, the
most oft-repeated being:
1. It excludes voluntary confessions otherwise
admissible by reason of the time element
alone.
2. It will set free many guilty persons whose
crimes were unwitnessed and who cannot be
interrogated in accordance with the most ideal
judicial guidelines.
3. In conspiracy cases, the prompt arraignment
requirement will publicize the arrest and warn
other conspirators to flee or destroy evidence.
4. Innocent persons legally detained by police
6 Mallory v. U. S., 354 U. S. 449, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479
(1957).
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under "probable cause" while their alibi is
being verified will have to be arraigned and
suffer the disgrace of disclosure.
The McNabb-Mallory Rationale could conceivably
result in the ludicrous situation wherein a police
officer would have to insist that the willing suspect
refrain from confessing his crime until after he has
been arraigned.
In unusual-but not inconceivable-situations,
the officers might be precluded from arraigning a
suspect because of the lack of witnesses and the
absence of physical evidence. In a case such as
this, a confession would be necessary in order to
obtain a warrant recommendation from the
prosecutor. But this same confession, so vital to
the case, is in danger of being invalidated later on
because it was obtained before the arraignment.
It was the possibility of situations such as these
that prompted U. S. Supreme Court justice White
to remark that effective law enforcement might
soon require the presence of a public defender in
each police squad car.
7
We should bear in mind that prior to the
McNabb-Mallory Rationale, the traditional test
of a confession and its admissibility was that it be
both voluntary and trustworthy. That was and
still is the test in England, where the Judges of the
Queen's Bench have outlined specific rules for the
interrogation of prisoners while in the custody of
the police. But the McNabb-Mallory Rule has
changed this traditional concept and has sub-
stituted "guidelines" that are at best flimsy and
tenuous.
Yet the precise scope of the Mallory case alone
is still a matter of serious dispute. A later decision,
Trilling v. United States, 260 F. 2d 667 (D.C. Cir.
1958) brought no less that five disparate points of
view (the Court of Appeals sat en banc) about
7 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758
(1964). Dissenting from the majority opinion were
Justices White, Stewart, Clark, and Harlan. Justice
WVhite referred to the court's application of the 6th
Amendment through the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment to the facts of this case as a "* new and
nebulous rule of due process***", and that the decision
"*** stands as an impenetrable barrier to any interro-
gation once the accused has become a suspect. From
that very moment apparently his right to counsel at-
taches, a rule wholly unworkable and impossible to ad-
minister unless police cars are equipped with public de-
fenders and undercover agents and police informants
have defense counsel at their side." He further indi-
cated that law enforcement "*** will be crippled and
its task made a great deal more difficult, all in my
opinion, for unsound, unstated reasons, which can find
no home in any of the provisions of the Constitution."
Mallory. Judge Danaher held that if the purpose
of detention is to extract damaging statements,
then the McNabb-Mallory Rule is violated, but
went on to say that if a question asked during a
period of legal detention was followed by a con-
fession, then the confession could be used. Judge
Burger concurred with Danaher reluctantly but
only because he felt "compelled by the Mallory
case." Judge Bazelon, on the other hand, reads
Mallory as forbidding the use of any confession
obtained by questioning before being brought
before a magistrate. Judge Fahy wrote a brief
sentence merely announcing his vote to reverse
the challenged convictions and citing Mallory.
Judge Prettyman expressed the view that any
confession can be employed unless the police were
guilty of oppressive treatment. In short, Judge
Prettyman indicated that he would require some
evidence that the police had overreached them-
selves before refusing to admit a confession under
Mallory.
In 1960, Judge Burger again attempted to
summarize Mallory: "In short, when a plea of
unnecessary delay is before us, we must examine
in detail all the circumstances surrounding it,
taking into consideration the manner in which the
interrogation was conducted, the length of time
involved, and particularly the purpose which the
police had in conducting their inquiry, if the
purpose can be discerned."
This whole concept raises the question-hypo-
thetical, to be sure, but nevertheless worth con-
sidering. What if Lee Harvey Oswald had con-
fessed the assassination of President Kennedy
during the intensive questioning that preceded
his arraignment? Would the Supreme Court,
following the path of McNabb-Mallory, have
ruled out the confession or evidence obtained as
"fruits of the confession", and overturned any
Texas court conviction?
Professor Inbau, testifying before a Senate
hearing in 1958 relative to Congressional legislation
introduced to overcome the effect of the Mallory
rule, said: "The Court, in the McNabb case, was
out to discipline the police. That was the avowed
purpose of it. It was not laid down as a rule for the
protection of the innocent. It was, in my opinion,
an exercise of a purely executive function to
discipline the police."8 To discipline police, Pro-
8 Admission of Evidence (Mallory Rule), Hearings
before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on the




fessor Inbau added, was not the function of the
court. He went on to say: "The true function of
the court in these matters involving confessions,
it seems to me, is to set up rules that are going to
insure protection of the innocent and at the same
time make it possible to convict the guilty."
In delivering the opinion of the court in the
historic McNabb case, Justice Frankfurter said:
"Zeal in tracking down crime is not in itself an
assurance of soberness of judgment. Experience
has therefore counselled that safeguards must be
provided against the dangers of the overzealous
as well as the despotic." 9 But the main issue at
hand is not perpetuation of the overzealous or the
despotic, but the threatened stifling of the con-
scientious and the dedicated.
If these so-called "safeguards" become the device
through which the effectiveness of law enforce-
ment is diminished, then the very purpose for the
establishment of these safeguards-the protection
of the individual-has been nullified.
Chief justice Warren has reduced the contro-
versy to its basic elements, calling it "a conflict
between two fundamental interests of society:
its interest in prompt and efficient law enforce-
ment, and its interest in preventing the rights of
its individual members from being abridged by
unconstitutional methods of law enforcement.
10
To achieve the perfect balance of these two
basic concepts is a formidable task, particularly
when unreasonable restrictions shackle our police
agencies and tilt the balance in favor of the law-
breaker. A striking example is in the vital area of
search and seizure. It is the Mapp v. Ohio decision,
in 1961, in which the majority opinion held, for
the first time and, more significantly, overruling
previous decisions, that all evidence obtained by
illegal search and seizure was inadmissible in a
state court."
The rule excluding the use of incriminating
evidence when unreasonably seized originated in
the Weeks v. United States case, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). Referred to as the Weeks exclusionary rule,
it has subsequently been applied in criminal cases
in the Federal courts. The majority of the states,
however, refused to apply this rule, and in 1949,
in Wolf v. Colorado12 the U.S. Supreme Court
9 McNabb v. U. S., 318 U. S. 332, 87 L. Ed. 819
(1934).
10 Henry v. U. S., 361 U. S. 98 (1959).
n Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).
1 Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U. S. 25 (1949).
ruled that the basic protection the individual has
under the 14th Amendment does not require a
state to suppress or exclude relevant evidence of a
crime, even though such evidence was obtained
in an unreasonable search.'
3
The Mapp decision, involving use as evidence
of pornographic material seized by Cleveland
police during a search without a warrant, over-
ruled Wolf v. Colorado. The brief of the defendant
in the Mapp case did not urge the court to overrule
Wolf. The brief of the Ohio and American Civil
Liberties Unions, as amici, did request such action
but without argumentation.
Noting this in a strong dissent, justice Harlan
said: "The present action amounts to a summary
reversal of the Wolf case without argument. I am
bound to say that what has been done is not likely
to promote respect either for the court's adjudi-
catory process or for the stability of the decisions."
justice Harlan dearly saw the effect which the
Mapp decision would have on law enforcement
agencies. He said further:
"In my view this court should continue to
forebear from fettering the states with an
adamant rule which may embarrass them in
coping with their own peculiar problems in
criminal law enforcement."
Justice Harlan was in excellent judicial company
in his dissent. For example in 1926, justice
Cardozo, then on the New York Court of Appeals,
in refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in People
v. Defore,14 added a succinct question: "A criminal
must go free because the constable has blundered?"
The point at issue in Mapp was not the guilt of
the defendant. She was obviously guilty since the
Ohio criminal code prohibits the mere possession
of pornogaphic material. The point was rather the
propriety of the procedures used by the police in
securing evidence that established the guilt. Must
we free the burglar because the loot was dis-
covered during a search without a warrant? Must
we free the murderer because the gun was found
during a so-called illegal search?
The Mapp decision, it must be pointed out,
gives protection only to the guilty, in ruling out
evidence which proves their guilt. It gives no
13 Petition of John T. Corrigan, Prosecuting Attor-
ney, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, for Rehearing of Mapp
v. Ohio, JR. CR. LAw, CRn. & P.S., Vol. 52, pp. 439-
444.
14 People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13,150 N.E. 585 (1926).
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direct protection to innocent victims of arbitrary
intrusion by the police.15
Another Supreme Court decision points up the
problem which law enforcement agencies have in
the area of arrest and search procedures. This is
the Henry case, which involved an arrest in
Chicago by FBI agents. 16 While investigating a
theft from an interstate shipment of whiskey, the
agents received information from the defendant's
employer leading them to believe the defendant
was involved. They observed him placing some
cartons in a car. After stopping the car, the agents
heard the defendant say, "It is the G's." The car
was searched and the cartons seized. They con-
tained stolen radios.
The defendant was convicted, but the U.S.
Supreme Court overruled. justice Douglas, ex-
pressing the majority opinion, held that the arrest
took place when the agents stopped the car, and
that at that time they had no probable cause to
believe that the defendant was violating or had
violated the law.
In a dissent, Chief Justice Warren stated that
the arrest was not made at the time the car was
stopped but at a later time when the agents had
reasonable cause in making the arrest without a
warrant. Chief Justice Warren defended the
actions of the FBI agents in these words:
"It is only be such alertness that crime is
discovered, interrupted, prevented, and pun-
ished. We should not place additional burdens
on law enforcement agencies."
Now let us suppose that, instead of finding cartons
of stolen radios, the FBI agents had found a
bullet-riddled corpse in that car, along with other
evidence that the suspect had committed murder.
Under Supreme Court reasoning, the murderer
might have gone free.
justice Tom C. Clark, in speaking of the pro-
cedural quagmire in which law enforcement
agencies and prosecutors find themselves, said:
"We hear much these days of an increasing
crime rate and a breakdown in law enforcement.
Some place the blame on police officers. I say
there are others who must shoulder much of
that responsibility."' 7
15 Kingsley A. Taft, Chief justice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, Vol. 50, AMR. BA I JouRNAL, Vol. 50,
at pp. 817 and 818 (Sept. 1964), Protecting the Public
from Mapp v. Ohio.
1" Henry v. U. S., supra.
1 Editorial, DETRorr FREE PREss (April 7, 1961).
On the controversial issues of arraignment,
interrogation, search and seizure, and admissi-
bility of evidence and confessions, which have
been outlined in some detail, the Supreme Court
has presented us with split decisions in many
cases. Dare we, in view of this split, hope for
future reversals which would help our law enforce-
ment agencies perform their functions more effec-
tively? In view of the present atmosphere, this
seems quite unlikely.
Perhaps there should be an attempt to seek
some kind of curb on the review powers of the
Supreme Court. Although action of this sort is
Constitutionally provided for, any attempts to
repress the high court's review authority would
interfere with the traditional concept of American
justice.
What, then, is the remedy? We believe that the
people themselves have it within their grasp. If
they believe that the tide is moving too strongly
in one direction and that the hobbles on police
procedures are threats to competent protection
of the public, the answer is clear: The Constitution
should be amended.
An outstanding example of what can be ac-
complished when the public becomes aroused has
been a part of the Michigan Constitution since
1936. In that year, Michigan's citizens, alarmed
by increasing lawlessness, voted overwhelmingly
to amend the State Constitution to permit the use
in evidence of inherently dangerous weapons
seized outside of dwelling places."' The amendment
was strengthened by the voters in 1952 to include
narcotics. 19 When Michigan adopted a new Consti-
tution in 1963, the amendments of 1936 and 1952
were included. Today, the article regarding the
prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure
provides that: "The provisions of this section
shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any
criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm,
bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon,
seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of
any dwelling house in this state."' 0
It is interesting to note that the people of
Michigan are satisfied that this amendment to
their State Constitution does not constitute any
jeopardy to their own individual liberties, but
Is1936 Amendment, Art. 11, Sec. 10, Mich. Consti-
tution of 1908.
191952 Amendment, Art. 11, Sec. 10, Mich. Consti-
tution of 1908.




rather that it is necessary for their own protection
and welfare.
The U. S. Constitution should provide for the
unhindered introduction in court of evidence
relevant to the guilt or innocence of a suspected
lawbreaker. Safeguards, of course, would have to
be provided to prevent abuse under such an
amendment. The guarantees of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments must in no way be
abrogated.
Long overdue is the demand that either the
courts or the Congress define the proper time limit
for detention before committal. A time limit that
would protect the prisoner's rights and at the
same time give an opportunity for investigation
satisfactory to the police. If it is believed that
the exclusionary device of the McNabb case is not
a sufficient sanction, then a proper penalty for
exceeding the time limit should be detailed.
We feel that public sentiment would support a
constitutional amendment and other remedial
action. The public does want law enforcement
agencies freed to perform their duties in the most
efficient way possible, while maintaining a sensible
balance between individual liberties and public
protection.
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